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ANALYSIS OF ORE PRODUCTION

with conclusions

FIRST REPORT

Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 July 1949

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INTRODUCTION

The Committee was directed, by memorandum from AD/ORE date 4 May, 1949, to "review past and present ORE production, for the purpose of appraising the degree of correspondence that exists between the ORE production effort and its mission." The Committee proceeded, (a) to examine the basic NSC, CIA, and ORE directives for an authoritative statement of an ORE mission; and (b) to examine the actual ORE production in order to establish the direction it has taken. The Committee agreed that it would limit itself to a descriptive and quantitative analysis of ORE production, and not to make judgments respecting the quality of this production.

I. THE BASIC DIRECTIVES (See Appendix "A")

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A. No adequate definition of an ORE mission exists. The Committee could not find in the basic NSA 1947, NSC, CIA, and ORE directives any statement of a specific ORE mission that was sufficiently clear and detailed, and generally understood and accepted both within and outside of ORE to provide a proper continuing basis for guiding or appraising ORE activities and production.

The National Security Act of 1947 and the basic NSC directives provide an extremely general definition of a CIA mission. CIA is made responsible for producing "National Intelligence," and for performing "Services of Common Concern" on behalf of existing intelligence agencies. NSCID #3 further defined National Intelligence as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department..., and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department..."

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This broadly stated CIA responsibility was not, however, given the more explicit definition that would have spelled out its relevant parts in the form of a mission for ORE. Consequently, ORE has been without an authoritative frame of reference by which its production effort could have been planned, guided and appraised. The difficulties inherent in this situation have been dealt with by administrative decisions which have, in general, been directed to problems of procedure, forms of production, and inter-agency relations rather than to the development of a clear official policy that would act in lieu of an authoritative statement of mission.

Consequently, the Committee considered that a significant gap developed between the basic NSC directives which broadly indicated a

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mission for CIA, and the actual basis on which ORE produces intelligence.

B. This gap, which could have been bridged by spelling out a broad statement of a CIA mission in terms of a precise operational mission for ORE, has instead been filled by ad hoc judgments and commitments.

These developed in connection with specific external requests made upon ORE; and, more significantly, from individual and subordinate concepts of function and method based on the judgment of Branch and Group chiefs and reflecting the capabilities, work-habits, and internal organization of Branches and Groups.

Thus, in the absence of specific definition from above and overall policy guidance from within, the production effort of ORE represents an essentially uncontrolled evolution, in the course of which patterns of production have been initiated on an ad hoc basis and become confirmed by repetition. These patterns, which are identified below, gradually came to have some of the validity of "missions." While no single mission of ORE has been established, a variety of "missions" have evolved in practice.*

* Note is taken of certain ORE Operating Procedures, in which over-all policy guidance is introduced; but the Committee cannot find that the development of a variety of patterns of production was significantly checked.

II. PATTERNS OF ORE PRODUCTION (See Appendix 'B')

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The following patterns emerge when ORE production is broken down by type:

1. Periodically Recurrent Production.
2. Reports and Estimates.
3. Production of intelligence support on a continuing basis for other CIA offices and outside agencies; and the performance of Services of Common Concern.

A. Periodically Recurrent Production. (See Appendix 'B', Sect. II)

This category includes the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries, the CIA Monthly Review, Branch Weekly and monthly working papers, and Branch daily and weekly estimates. Production of this category claims approximately 15% of ORE professional man-hours. There is evidence that,

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- (1) This category of production has steadily expanded in volume

and variety of publication. Expansion has been particularly marked during 1948-49.

(2) The concept of "current intelligence" has broadened beyond the definition given in NSCID #3.* There is a marked tendency to comment on

* The Committee decided not to use the terms "Current" and "Staff" intelligence in its Report. These terms, as employed within ORE, do not correspond with the definitions given by NSCID #3; and, in addition, the distinction between them has become blurred. NSCID #3 defines "Current Intelligence" as "spot information of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation."

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and to evaluate the "spot information" reported. There is also a tendency to produce comprehensive area reviews and analyses of significant developments.

B. Reports and Estimates (See Appendix "B", Sect. I)

This category includes the SR, ORE, and IM Series, and Special Evaluations. Production of this category claims approximately 23% of ORE professional man-hours (16% for ORE and IM items; 7% for SR items.) There is evidence that,

(1) There has been a trend away from the handling of broadly defined to the handling of narrowly defined problems; from long-term to short-term problems; from the predictive method of treatment to the non-predictive; and, finally, from the fully and formally coordinated type of publication to the incompletely or informally coordinated type.

(2) This trend generally correlates with an increase in the number of specific external requests made upon ORE, and reflects the character of these requests.

C. Supporting Services and Services of Common Concern (See Appendix "B", Sect. III)

This category includes the evaluation of OO, OSO, A-2 and State Department Reports; support of OSO, OPC, NSC-4 Committee, and External Research Program; the review of NIS material; and the activities of the Map Branch. Excluding the Basic Intelligence Group and Map Branch, activity in this category claims approximately 16% of ORE professional man-hours. This represents as much time as is currently spent on Periodically

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Recurrent Production or on the production of ORE and IM items. It is considered that,

(1) The man-hours spent on these activities take up an increasingly significant proportion of ORE professional time.

(2) Although some of these activities might fall within the meaning of "Services of Common Concern," few of them can be seriously considered as related to the production of "national intelligence," no matter how that general term is defined.

D. ORE production can also be classified according to the presumed use for which it is intended

1. To meet high policy level needs. The CIA Daily and, to some extent, the Weekly Summary, the CIA Monthly Review, and miscellaneous ORE and IM items fall within this category.

2. To meet the needs of a wide range of lower-level users, in both policy-making and other intelligence agencies. A large number of ORE and most IM items, the CIA Weekly Summary to some extent, Branch working papers, and almost all Supporting Services fall within this category.

III. DETERMINING FACTORS IN SHAPING PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION

The present patterns of ORE production are the result of an essentially uncontrolled evolution, in which the significant determining factors have been external demand, individual and varying concepts of function and method, and internal pressures, all of which have had relatively free play.

A. Much ORE production has followed from external requests, and from the presumption that such requests indicated a continuing need. The CIA Daily Summary, the SR Series, the "Current Situation in _____" type of ORE, a large number of ORE and IM items, and many Supporting Services were initiated and then continued in this way. This factor, however, is considered less significant than those operating within ORE itself because the bulk of production has been self-initiated.

B. The self-initiated production of ORE has, in considerable part, been shaped by various and often contradictory ideas about the mission of ORE and the method in which it might best be carried out. The following concepts of mission are noted as having been influential:

1. ORE should produce intelligence in support of high-level policy makers.

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2. ORE should produce intelligence for a wide-range of lower-level users.

3. ORE should produce intelligence in continuing support for Departmental planning and operations.

The following concepts of method are noted as having been also influential:

1. ORE intelligence should be produced on a periodically recurring basis, ranging in time span from daily to monthly, and in content from analysis of significant developments to comprehensive area reviews.

2. ORE intelligence should consist of reports and estimates, which should be made only as a significant need exists, or is considered to exist.

3. ORE intelligence should be restricted to evaluations and predictions.

4. ORE intelligence should emphasize reporting and "spot information."

C. These concepts were for the most part formulated within ORE and without direct reference to the needs of high policy bodies or other consumers of intelligence. This is due to the fact that no close working relationship has developed between ORE and the policy-making bodies. Hence it has come about that ORE production, both in its doctrine and practice, has been based largely upon the producer's judgment and his informed guesses as to what was important or what might be needed.

D. Of equal importance is the fact that ORE production has also been conditioned by other identifiable internal considerations. The following are noted as having been influential:

1. The long established tradition in all intelligence agencies of producing current periodical reviews.

2. The belief that periodically recurrent production is excellent training, particularly for junior analysts; serves to maintain a running record; and provides a morale-boosting medium of expression.

3. The fact that much periodically recurrent production, as well as many IM items are a natural by-product of the intelligence process employed to produce fully developed estimates.

4. The desire to avoid the difficulties of coordination with other intelligence agencies.

5. The existence of competition between Branches and Groups.

6. The less rigid qualitative demands upon personnel if production "follows the cables," does not require special aptitudes, and can be systematized into a controllable routine.

IV. COMPETITION AND CONFUSION BETWEEN PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION.

A. In the absence of a defined mission or basic administrative control, little uniformity of production has been established among the Branches and Groups. One Branch puts its major effort into ORE items. Other Branches emphasize periodically recurrent production. Two Branches expend the largest single portion of their professional time on supporting services.

B. Furthermore, the various patterns of production make competing claims on limited professional time. Each Branch or Group, and every analyst within a Branch or Group tends to acquire a multiplicity of functions and responsibilities which prevents adequate attention being given to any particular category of activity or production. Thus methods and concepts of mission, which are essentially complementary, appear as competitive. External requests, periodical production, and supporting services tend to take precedence over other types of production because they so frequently involve working to fixed "dead lines."

C. The free play of competing concepts of function and method has left ORE exposed to the pressure of external requests because, in the absence of a uniform authoritative concept, it becomes very difficult to judge the validity of such requests.

V. SHIFT IN THE EMPHASIS OF ORE PRODUCTION

The most significant trend revealed by the Committee's examination is that the effort of ORE has quantitatively shifted from the production of high-level intelligence for a restricted policy-making audience to the production of a wide range of general intelligence for a broad lower-level audience. (See Appendix "B," Sect. I, B; II)

A. The production of Reports and Estimates during the period July 1946 - December 1947 suggests an effort to establish a pattern emphasizing a broad political-economic-strategic approach and attempting to project trends and predict future developments. During the same period, the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries were the only official periodical publications, and were distributed to a highly restricted audience.

B. In the period 1948-49, this pattern altered. The emphasis in Reports and Estimates shifted from the broad, long-term type of problem to the narrowly defined, short-term type; and from the predictive to the non-predictive type. It is significant that the IM Series, designed to meet external requests and essentially more limited in scope and method than the ORE Series, was initiated in this period. A quantitative displacement of ORE by IM has occurred. Simultaneously, a wide range of Branch working papers were disseminated to a working-level audience outside ORE. In addition, ORE accepted an increasing number of commitments to provide supporting services for other CIA offices and outside agencies. Thus, while ORE has attempted to maintain its original high level function, its production effort has quantitatively shifted to the fulfillment of basically different types of requirement.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

That Committee finds that,

A. The present production effort of ORE is the product of an essentially uncontrolled evolution.

B. The reasons for this form of development are considered to have been,

1. The absence of a mission for ORE defined at the NSC level.

2. The absence of a clearly and consistently developed policy within CIA to stand in place of a defined mission.

3. The consequent free play given to internal suggestions and external requests.

C. Uncontrolled evolution has resulted in the establishment of a variety of patterns of activity and production. Each of these has, by repeated use, become a determining influence almost equivalent to that of a "mission." These "pattern - missions" overlap, interfere, and compete with each other for limited professional man-hours.

D. In particular, the emphasis in production has shifted from reporting, synthesis and estimating for a restricted, high-level, policy-making audience to reporting, periodical review, analysis, and short-term prediction for a comparatively unrestricted lower-level audience.

E. A significant consequence of this evolution is that CIA, though

still defined as the apex of the governmental intelligence structure, seems to be increasingly regarded as in the status of a competing IAC Agency. ORE is unfavorably placed to compete at this level, since it is without the definitive guidance provided by a traditional Departmental responsibility.

F. There is no evidence in the basic documents that it was intended or desired that ORE, as the producing component of CIA, should be simply an additional intelligence unit in the governmental structure. There is, on the contrary, evidence that it was intended and desired that ORE should provide a final point of intelligence synthesis in that structure; and that, as such, its authoritative focus should be the highest policy-making level of government, particularly that sector of policy-making that lay beyond the competence of single Departments or Agencies.

G. Many of the patterns of activity and production, even though by strict definition they appear remote from the general responsibility of CIA as laid down in the basic documents, may, however, be valid;

1. Because they are an indispensable even if subordinate part of the whole intelligence process which leads to synthesis and estimate.

2. Because they fill a positive need which cannot, in the present state of the governmental intelligence structure, be met in any other way

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H. The immediate problem is not necessarily to be solved by a wholesale lopping off of all activities and categories of production that do not conform to a strict interpretation of the basic directives. It can, however, be realistically approached by recognizing and separating the various categories of production in relation to

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(1) The reporting, reviewing, and analytical part of the intelligence process

(2) The synthesizing and estimating part of the intelligence process.

This then makes it possible to decide which activities and categories of production are valid and on what grounds; and to establish priorities among them as a first step toward

(1) Making the organizational changes required to discharge effectively the responsibilities accepted;

(2) Establishing the administrative controls needed to check further undirected evolution, to eliminate conflicting claims on limited capabilities, and to keep future production in accord with agreed and understood Mission or Policy.

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APPENDIX "A"
to
First Report
Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee

MISSION OF ORE

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Appendix A: "Basic Documents: Preliminary Report on Mission of ORE

1. The basic documents examined were:

- (a) The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 1947), Sec.
- (b) National Security Council Directives (NSCID).
No. 1 of 12 Dec. 1947; No. 3 of 18 Jan. 1948.
- (c) Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCI),
No. 3/1 of 8 July 1948; No. 3/2 of 13 Sept. 1948.
- (d) ORE Statement of Functions of 15 July 1948, confirmed
in Organization and Functions CIA of 1 Jan. 1949.

2. Discussion

(a) NSC 1947, Sect. 102 (d) (3), defined one of the duties of CIA as, "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for ... appropriate dissemination and to perform ... additional services of common concern"

(b) NSCID 1, paras 4, 7, 8, expands the preceding as follows:

(1) "... shall produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence...."

(2) "... shall perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common concern to these Agencies as the NSC determines...."

(3) "... shall disseminate national intelligence
Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent."*

* Note is taken that sub-para (3) introduces questions of procedural relations between CIA and Intelligence Agencies, but does not define or necessarily limit the responsibility of CIA.

(c) NSCID 3, paras. 1 (d) (e), defines National Intelligence,

(1) Negatively, by distinguishing it from Departmental Intelligence, which is, "that intelligence, including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency ... to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities."

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(2) Positively, as "integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department . . . , and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department."*

* It is noted that Current Intelligence is defined as "spot information or intelligence ... of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs ...;" and that it shall be produced and disseminated by all Departments and Agencies, including CIA, "to meet their internal requirements or external responsibilities...."

It is noted that Staff Intelligence is defined as "intelligence prepared by any department through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it ... to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities; and that a department has the "ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own department shall require."

(d) No additional spelling out of the CIA responsibility to produce national intelligence was made at the NSC level. In particular, the relevant parts of the statements assigning responsibility were not reformulated as a statement of mission for ORE. DCI Directives, examined from this point of view, provide no such statement. They spell out problems of concurrence and dissent. This lack of specific interpretation, not significantly felt at the Director IAC level, created difficulties at the operational level of ORE where it was necessary to plan production with no other guide than a broad responsibility to produce national intelligence.

(e) ORE has attempted to fill the need in its Statement of Functions, later approved by DCI and incorporated in Organization and Functions CIA of 1 Jan. 1949. ORE is there defined as "the exclusive (except for science) intelligence evaluation, analysis, and production component of CIA." *

* A question arises of whether other Offices of CIA -- OSO, OPC -- do not also produce and disseminate; and whether ORE is committed to their support.

The mission of ORE is there stated to be responsibility for the production and presentation of national intelligence. A slight expansion of the basic definition of national intelligence is made in the phrases, "required for the formulation and administration of policy and operational decisions affecting national security;" and "reports and estimates will present and interpret the significance of foreign conditions and develop-

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ments which affect national security." Actually the effort to fill a need does not result in an essential definition of mission by which Branches and Groups can uniformly be guided. The spelling out is in functional terms describing the existing activities and procedures of Branches and Groups. The statement is primarily descriptive of what has been and is being done; and of the division of responsibility among the Branches and Groups. In consequence, a statement of an ORE mission, capable of being used to guide a production effort, does not emerge.

3. Conclusions from Discussion

(a) It is considered, on the basis of this analysis, that a significant gap exists between the basic NSCID documents, which broadly indicate the mission of CIA, and the actual basis on which ORE produces intelligence. This gap, which should normally have been bridged by spelling out the broad statement of mission in precisely clarified operational directives, has apparently been filled instead by:

(1) An accumulation of ad hoc commitments, in consequence of responding to specific requests.

(2) An accumulation of particular interpretation of mission, deriving from the capabilities, organization, work-habits, inter-agency contacts, and personal judgments of Branches and Groups.

(b) It is considered that there is no available basis for "appraising the degree of correspondence that exists between the ORE production effort and its missions" because

(1) National Intelligence, which it is the mission of ORE to produce on behalf of CIA, has not been defined in a way that permits the planning and operation of an effective production effort.

(2) The production effort has, instead, grown up in response to various and not necessarily correlated demands, and to various and necessarily generally accepted interpretations of basic documents.

(c) The basic responsibility of CIA, phrased in terms of "national intelligence," though stated in the general directives, has not been given the more explicit statement and definition needed if it was to provide the basis for planning and directing a supporting production operation; i.e., become the mission of ORE.

(d) [REDACTED] are essentially concerned with procedures and do not provide the statement and definition of mission required by ORE.

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APPENDIX "B"

to

First Report

Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee

PRODUCTION EFFORT OF ORE

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Appendix B: "Preliminary Report: Analysis ORE Production."

1. The following general types of production, covering the period Feb. 1946 to 23 May, 1949, were considered,

(a) Reports and Estimates: (ORE, IM, SR Series, and Special Evaluations).

(b) Periodically recurrent: (ORE Daily and Weekly, CIA Monthly Series, Branch Dailies, Weeklies, Monthlies).

(c) Supporting: (Services of Common Concern, Support for operation of other CIA components and other Agencies).

2. No use has been made of technical distinctions employed within ORE, as "Staff" and "Current Intelligence." Reference is occasionally made to these terms but only in the sense in which they have been defined in NSCID #3.

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I. Reports and EstimatesA. Situation Reports (SR Series)

Developed by combining an external request from CNO (ONI) for a basic handbook on selected countries and a presumed need for basic country studies to fill the gap that would exist until NIS volumes were ready. A total commitment of 47 items was made and is in considerable part fulfilled. Scheduling calls for completion in 1950. The Series is regarded by the Committee as static and has been given no further consideration. The following statistics give the picture:

Published to date	24
Under Agency review	6
In progress or scheduled	17
	<u>47</u>

B. ORE and Intelligence Memoranda (IM) Series (See Appendix C)

1. It was essential to devise descriptive categories for use in classifying items. The following categories were agreed upon after a spot check of the contents of an adequate number of items.

Group A: A Situation Analysis

Essentially an estimating paper, of which the intent is to give an accurate description of a situation and to project future broad developments. Situation can mean, the state of an area (Current Situation in Spain -- ORE 53) or a political, economic or sociological complex (Consideration regarding the Italian Colonies -- ORE 39; Significance World Federation of Trade Unions -- ORE 214-8; Political and Economic Situation Selected Areas -- IM-51). The method of such a paper is to correlate intelligence information in order to predict the operation of inter-related factors and trends.

Group B: The Probable Development of a Selected Factor

Essentially an estimating paper, narrower in scope than a Situation Analysis since it selects a single factor or isolates a single trend for analysis. It frequently gives detailed treatment to material that would otherwise be handled as an aspect of a Situation Analysis. The intent of such a paper is to project into the future the operation of the factor or trend selected. (Possible Developments in Palestine, ORE 7-48; Possible Program ... Soviet Moves in Germany, IM-24).

Group C: The Consequences of a Selected Course of Action.

A paper that usually proceeds from action decisions or

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accomplished facts to a prediction of the consequences that can be presumed to follow. An important variant of this type is noted: an action decision is assumed to have been made, or an event to have taken place, and the consequences are then predicted as if developing from actual fact. (Consequences of the Withdrawal of US Forces from Tsingtao -- ORE 47-48; Probable Soviet Reaction to US Attempt to Force Berlin Blockade, IM-118).

Group D: Background Material

This type of paper essentially selects factual data in order to provide a correct frame of reference. The method used is historical in that it organizes and interprets established data, and does not undertake predictions. (France's Policy toward Germany, ORE 39-48; World Oil Data, IM-126).

Group E: Spot Reporting of Intelligence Information

This type of paper essentially reports, on the basis of timeliness, intelligence information of any or all kinds. It may, as part of its intent, include an evaluation of the material reported, or an indication of the material's significance. (Hungarian Efforts to Circumvent Prohibited Purchase of US Machine Tools, IM-83).

Group F: Unclassifiable

This category is used to cover items which, for various reasons, were unclassifiable.

2. Table I Total Production distributed by Groups

<u>Groups</u>	<u>ORE</u>	<u>IM</u>
A. Situation Analyses	28	11
B. Probable Developments	40	42
C. Consequences Analyzed	13	10
D. Background	23	22
E. Spot Reporting	10	80
F. Unclassifiable	1	7
	<u>115</u>	<u>172</u>
Total Production	287	

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3. Table II Origin of items distributed by Groups

<u>Self-initiated</u>			<u>External Requests</u>		
<u>ORE</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>Groups</u>	<u>ORE</u>	<u>IM</u>	
18	4	A Situation Analyses A	10	7	
30	7	B Probable Developments B	10	35	
3	4	C Consequences Analyzed C	10	6	
18	2	D Background D	5	20	
4	26	E Spot Reporting E	6	54	
0	0	F Unclassified F	1	7	
73	43	287	42	129	

4. Table III External Requests detailed

Totals	<u>Groups ABC</u>		<u>Groups DEF</u>	
	<u>ORE</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>ORE</u>	<u>IM</u>
Executive Office President	3	6	5	8
NSC	18	4	1	0
NSC-4 Committee	1	3	0	0
Sec. Defense	2	7	1	7
JIG	0	18	1	15
IAC	5	3	1	5
NSRB	0	1	0	1
Munitions Board	0	0	0	1
ECA	0	0	1	5
SA NACC	1	0	0	1
25X1C [REDACTED]	0	0	1	3
US congress	0	0	0	6
	30	48	11	81

Production July 1946 - Dec 1947 analyzed.

5. Production for this period is 37 items in the ORE Series. The distribution by Groups is

	<u>Groups ABC</u>	<u>Groups DEF</u>
1946 (2nd half)	2	4
1947 (1st half)	9	3
1947 (3rd quarter)	2	1
1947 (4th quarter)	15	1
	28	9

19 items were self-initiated; 18 requested. Of the requested items, 11 come in the Fourth Quarter of 1947.

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6. Production Jan. 1948 to 23 May 1949 analyzed.

(a) Chart I: Distribution of Groups ABC and DEF on a units per month basis.

See insert following

(b) Chart II: External requests distributed by Groups ABC and DEF on a units per month basis.

See insert following

(c) Chart III: Distribution of Self-initiated and Externally requested items, all Groups and all Series.

See insert following

(d) Chart IV: Distribution by ORE and IM Series.

See insert following

7. Special Evaluations

Treated separately because they have not developed into a fixed pattern of production. No Special Evaluations have been issued since Dec., 1948. It is possible that the purpose they were intended to serve has been absorbed by the growth of the IM Series, by the increased volume of periodic production, and by the external distribution of Branch Working Papers. The following breakdown is given for comparison.

A. Situation Analyses	1
B. Probable Developments	16
C. Consequences Analyzed	7
D. Background Material	2
E. Spot Reporting	12
F. Unclassifiable	0
Total	38

8. Comments on production of Reports and Estimates.

(a) Production during the period July 1946 - Dec. 1947 suggests an effort to establish a pattern for the production of ORE-IM Series. The character of this pattern is indicated by the preponderance of Group ABC items (75% approx) in which a broad

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CHART 1 - DISTRIBUTION BY GROUPS ABC AND DEF ON A UNITS PER MONTH BASIS

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



CHART 2 - EXTERNAL REQUESTS DISTRIBUTED BY GROUPS ABC AND DEF ON A UNITS PER MONTH BASIS




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HART 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF SELF INITIATED AND EXTERNALLY REQUESTED ITEMS (ALL GROUPS; BOTH SERIES)


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Self Initiated
Externally requested



HART 4 - DISTRIBUTION BY SERIES (ORE and IM)

ORE
IM



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politic-economic-strategic line of approach is taken and where an attempt is made to project trends and predict future developments rather than to report and evaluate current events. This pattern appeared to be given approval during the last three months of the period by requests from the NSC, made in conjunction with items on its staff agenda, for the production of eleven items in Group A (88% approx. of total production for the period).

(b) Production during the period Jan. 1948 - May 1949 shows well-defined trends away from this pattern.

(1) A shift from the broad, long-term type of problem to the narrowly-defined, short-term type of problem. (There is a quantitative shift from Group A and Group D items to Group B and Group E items.)

(2) A shift from the predictive type of item (Group ABC) to the non-predictive type (Group D E).

(3) A shift from full and formally coordinated production (ORE Series) to informally and even uncoordinated production (IM Series).

(4) The above trends correlate with an increase in external demands and are considered to be a reflection of the character of these external demands.

II. Periodically recurrent production.

A. This production consists of

1. Current Intelligence as defined in NSCID #3, in the form of CIA Daily Summary (Top Secret) and CIA Weekly Summary (Secret). Both are issued officially after coordination within CIA/ORE.

2. CIA Series, "Review of World Situation as it affects the security of the US."

3. Periodic publications by Branches and Groups. These are officially described as "Working Papers." They are given less complete coordination within CIA/ORE, but are regularly though informally disseminated outside CIA/ORE and even outside CIA.

B. The total of Periodic production, expressed in numbers of issues, is as follows:

ORE Daily (since 14 Feb. 1946)	1000
B/WE Daily (since 16 Jan. 1948)	312
Total of daily issues	1312

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ORE Weekly (since 7 June 1946)	156
Branch Weeklies	724
B/WE "Weekly Estimate"	31
Total of Weekly issues	911
Branch Monthlies	18
CIA Monthly Series	21
Total Monthly Issues	<u>39</u>
Grand total of Periodical Publications	2262

3. CIA Daily Summary (Top Secret)

1. Origin: an original and specific commitment, dating from Feb., 1946. It arose from a direct presidential request for a summary to replace the three or four dailies and a mass of cables which awaited him each morning.

2. Changes and trends: two such are noted, (a) it has become shorter, (b) a policy has developed of occasionally including an evaluation or comment when possible.

3. Present purpose: to select and brief each day cables of greatest significance to the security of the US in order to bring them to the attention of the highest officials. Degree of significance depends entirely on what happens to have been carried by the incoming and occasionally the outgoing traffic of the day.

D. CIA Weekly Summary (Secret)

1. Origin: self-initiated in June 1946. Conceived as a vehicle in which emerging trends were interpreted for high level use; and hence supplementary to CIA Daily Summary, in which comment was expressly forbidden by NIA action.

2. Changes and Trends: originally "Top Secret" and designed for the same distribution list as the CIA Daily. On 2 May 1948, it was downgraded to "Secret" and given a wider distribution, which now included the working levels of departments and agencies as well as policy-making levels.

3. Present purpose: to evaluate and project such events of a week as are of most importance to US security. The evaluating and projecting function has been emphasized as against reporting of briefing.

E. CIA Series

A monthly publication timed to meet the second regular meeting of the NSC. Originated in a suggestion of NSC Secretary and Secretariat. Coordinated within ORE.

F. Branch Weeklies

1. Origin: with one exception, self-initiated. (See para. H. 4 below.)

2. Changes and Trends: soon after their inception they became the source of raw material for the CIA Weekly Summary. This relationship was made official and was regularized by ORE Operating Procedure #9 of 14 May 1948. While no fundamental change in character was made, it is noted that the number of longer analytical articles has increased. A significant change in the use made of this production came with their informal distribution outside ORE and CIA. This development appears to have come about as working-level personnel in other offices and agencies became aware of the existence of the type of production and asked to be put on the distribution list.

3. Present purpose: to provide material for the CIA Weekly Summary, to provide a media for extensive Branch comment, to broaden the working level exchange of information and evaluation. They are produced on much the same principle that controls the CIA Weekly Summary, i.e., selection of significant events and evaluation and projection from them.

G. Branch Monthlies

1. Origin: self-initiated; one in Sept. 1948, two in Jan. 1949. Only two now produced, one having been discontinued after 1 May 1949. One Branch, which does not produce a Monthly, regularly adds a "Situation Memorandum" to its Weekly and this serves the intent of a Monthly. All Monthlies are disseminated outside ORE, and for the most part outside CIA.

2. Purpose: to provide a periodic review of the situation in the area of the Branch's concern. They are distinguished from the Branch Weekly by an intent to review a month's trends area by area and aside from the occurrence of significant events as reported on a weekly basis. In two instances, this intent is accompanied by an effort systematically to predict developments in the ensuing 30 days.

H. Daily and Weekly Estimates (produced by one Branch only).

1. Origin: self-initiated as a method of analytical exercise.

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Distributed outside ORE.

2. Purpose: to provide forecasts for the countries concerned. Systematic prediction is emphasized.

1. Comments on Periodically recurring Production.

1. Production has steadily increased: the volume of production in this category has steadily expanded, and the number of different types of publications has increased. The increase has been most marked in 1948-49.

Chart V: Growth of Periodical Production.

See insert following

2. The Concept of "Current Intelligence" has broadened beyond the definition of NSCID #3. At the start, it consisted only of the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries, which reported events and developments considered significant. These have continued, but to them has been added area reviews. In addition, a trend toward comment, evaluation, estimating, and predicting is noticeable. None of the publications in this category avowedly goes in for "spot" reporting; most specifically emphasize the estimating process.

3. Production in this category is divided into:

(a) Publications whose subject-matter is determined by important events taking place, or important cables arriving. (CIA Daily & Weekly Summaries, Branch Weeklies.)

(b) Publications which seek to provide a periodic stock-taking. (CIA Series, Branch Monthlies, Branch Daily and Weekly Estimates, and "Situation Memoranda" referred to above.)


On the basis of volume of production, (a) above is of more weight and official importance than (b) above.

4. Production developed from other considerations than a concept of "mission".

(a) Except for CIA Daily Summary, which originated on external demand and which generally conforms to the NSCID #3 definition of "Current Intelligence," production has been self-initiated by components of ORE in response to a variety of considerations, of which the more obvious are noted.

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CHART 5 - GROWTH OF PERIODICAL PRODUCTION



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(1) The need to maintain a running record, in which evaluation and estimate forms an essential supplement to files of raw material.

(2) The need to train analysts in making estimates and projecting situations by obliging them periodically to gather scattered facts and evidences and to formulate conclusions respecting them.

(3) For reasons of morale, a training procedure became an organized publication and provided a vehicle of expression.

(4) The need to exchange information and conclusions at a working-level, both within a Branch (as in B/LA, where a large number of small countries are covered), between Branches and Groups (as when a Regional Branch and a Functional Group must correlate), and finally outside ORE (as with the working levels of IAC Agencies).

(5) The responsibility of supporting the CIA Weekly Summary.

(b) The development of this type of production is considered to have proceeded more from the internal necessities and from custom and tradition of an intelligence organization than from defined responsibilities and official commitments.

5. The audience has greatly expanded and consequently become a less precise target.

ORE "Current Intelligence" was originally produced for a small select audience at the highest policy levels. While this has continued, the growth of periodic production, both by the nature of its content and the range of its distribution, has resulted in a broader and more systematic analysis of current developments for the use of a wide audience at the working level.

III. Supporting Production

ORE production in performance of services of common concern, in support of the operation of other Offices of CIA and of other Agencies, and in support of its own internal requirements has no analyzable pattern. It is, accordingly, merely reported with comments.

A. Services of Common Concern

CIA/ORE is officially committed to the maintenance of two

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continuing services of common concern:

(1) The coordinating, editing, and production of the National Intelligence Surveys (NIS). The Basic Intelligence Group/ORE is solely charged with responsibility for this commitment. It is estimated that the following components of ORE (B/EE, B/WE, B/NE, B/NO, and G/Tr) are at present expending between 5 - 10% of their available man-hours in reviewing material for NIS on behalf of the Basic Intelligence Group.

(2) ORE/Map Branch is committed to services of common concern, in the course of which it also fills the requirements of CIA/ORE.

B. Operations of Other Offices of CIA.

(1) ORE regularly evaluates OO and OSO field reports. Between March 1948 and May 1949, ORE evaluated 9293 OO reports, the lowest number in any one month being 504 and the highest 807.

(2) ORE/B/EE has recently undertaken a limited research project in support of CIA/OSO. This project is the preparation of encyclopedic information. It was not considered within the present terms of reference of the Basic Intelligence Group.

(3) CIA/OFC has requested support from CIA/ORE for its operational responsibilities, and commitments have been accepted.

C. Operations of other Departments and Agencies

(1) CIA/ORE is formally directed to support the Information Planning responsibility of the NSC-4 Committee, and in addition informally supports the operational desks of the State Department Information Program.

(2) CIA/ORE jointly participates with the State Department in the development of an External Research Program designed to correlate the work of scholars and the needs of government intelligence.

(3) CIA/ORE has accepted a commitment to evaluate FS Reports for the State Department and AA Reports for the Air Force.

D. Miscellaneous

It is noted that the key personnel of ORE/Group Economics (G/EO) serve as members of inter-departmental or agency committees or are in regular consultation with other departments or agencies. It is estimated that as much as 20% of the time of this key personnel is thus employed.

E. Comments on Supporting Activities

1. It is noted that the professional man-power employed in this type of activity is developing into a significant drain on the ORE production effort (16.00% of total man-hours, of which 2.50% is applicable to Services of Common Concern).

2. It is noted that a high proportion of the working time (20.00%) of Group/Economics is dispersed in external consultations and committees, of which only a small part is directly related to the production effort of ORE. It is possible that this may be the result of the present disorganized state of economic intelligence generally.

3. It is noted that commitments to engage in supporting activities have steadily increased through 1948-49 and that the expansion has taken place on an ad hoc basis and not in accordance with any observable principle.

IV. Distribution of professional work-hours

The information that follows is based upon data provided by ORE components. This data has been weighted to take into account the varying size of Branches and Groups. The percentages given are to be taken as approximate only. The Committee considers, however, that they do not significantly distort the over-all picture.

A. General Research and Administration 46.00%

This includes processing raw intelligence material, research activities, organized discussions, and administration.

B. Reports and Estimates Production 23.00%

- | | |
|---------------|-------|
| 1. ORE and IM | 16.00 |
| 2. SR Series | 7.00 |

This includes the productive process and coordination with IAC Agencies.

C. Periodically recurring Production 15.00%

This includes only the productive process from selection of material through final editorial work.

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D. Supporting Production

16.00%

This includes the performance of Services
of Common Concern and Supporting Services. (1)

-
- (1) The percentage is high because of the great proportion of
time spent in supporting services by B/EE (22.00%), G/Ec
(24.50%).
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APPENDIX "C"
to
First Report
Ad Hoc Production Review Subcommittee

DOCUMENTATION
ORE and IM Reports, June 1946 - May 1949

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Group A: Situation Analysis

Essentially an estimating paper, of which the intent is to give an accurate description of a situation and project future broad developments. Situation can mean the state of an area or a political, economic, or sociological complex. The method of such a paper is to correlate intelligence information in order to predict the operation of inter-related factors and trends.


<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 5/1	The Situation in Korea.	B/EE
ORE 6/1	The Situation in Greece.	B/NE
ORE 13/1	The Situation in Austria.	G/SI
ORE 15	The Hatay Question.	B/NE
ORE 39	Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of the Italian African Colonies.	G/SI
ORE 45	Implementation of Soviet Objectives in China.	B/FE
ORE 47	The Current Situation in Italy.	NSC
ORE 47/1	The Current Situation in Italy.	NSC
ORE 48	The Current Situation in Iran.	NSC
ORE 49	The Current Situation in Palestine.	NSC
ORE 50	The Current Situation in Turkey.	NSC
ORE 51	The Current Situation in Greece.	NSC
ORE 52	The Current Situation in the Mediterranean and the Near East.	NSC
ORE 53	The Current Situation in Spain	NSC

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 54	The Current Situation in Egypt.	NSC
ORE 62	Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea.	B/FE
ORE 63	Current Situation in French North Africa.	NSC
ORE 64	The Current Situation in France.	B/WE
ORE 13-48	Current Situation in Austria.	B/FE
ORE 15-48	The Current Situation in Korea.	B/FE
ORE 21-48	The Significance of the World Federation of Trade Unions in the Present Power Conflict.	G/IO
ORE 23-48	The Current Situation in the Free Territory of Trieste.	B/EE
ORE 28-48	Current Situation in Greece.	B/NE
ORE 35-48	Current Situation in Burma.	B/FE
ORE 45-48	The Current Situation in China.	B/FE
ORE 65-48	Current Situation in Iran.	B/NE
ORE 78-48	Current Situation in the Philippines.	B/FE
ORE 1-49	Current Political Situation in the Union of South Africa.	B/No
IM-15	Soviet armed forces strength and budget	DCI
IM-16	Soviet policy in Austria	B/WE
IM-51	Political and Economic Situation in Selected Areas at the outbreak of East-West Hostilities by July 1949	JIG
IM-97	Current Considerations affecting Argentine Foreign Policy	G/SI

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-105	Soviet Capabilities to Wage Biological Warfare.	JIG
IM-106	Soviet Capabilities to Wage Chemical Warfare.	JIG
IM-111	Strategic Importance of Taiwan.	NSC
IM-117	Soviet Capabilities for Employing Biological and Chemical Weapons.	JIG
IM-147	Obstacles to Early Formation of a Western Trade Union Federation.	G/IO
IM-154	Extent of Communist Influence in the Government of [REDACTED]	JIG
IM-172	The Situation in Argentina	B/LA

Group B: Probable Development of a Selected Factor

Essentially an estimating paper, narrower in scope than a Situation Analysis since it selects a single factor or isolates a single trend for analysis. It frequently gives detailed treatment to material that would otherwise be handled as an aspect of a Situation Analysis. The intent of such a paper is to project into the future the operation of the factor or trend selected.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 1	Soviet Foreign and Military Policy.	WH
ORE 1/1	Revised Soviet Tactics in International Affairs.	WH
ORE 9	The Succession of Power in the USSR.	G/SI
ORE 10	Forthcoming Elections in Bolivia.	B/LA
ORE 14	Future Soviet Participation in Long-Range International Air Transport.	G/Tr
ORE 19	Developments in the Azerbaijan Situation.	B/NE
ORE 44	 Problems, Issues.	B/FE
ORE 56	The Political Future in Spain.	B/WE
ORE 7-48	Possible Developments in Palestine.	B/NE
ORE 8-48	Peron and the Argentine Congressional Elections.	B/LA
ORE 9-48	Cuban Political Trends.	B/LA
ORE 11-48	Possible Developments Resulting from the Granting of Amnesty to Accused Collaborators in the Philippines.	B/FE
ORE 12-48	Prospects for a Negotiated Peace in China.	B/FE
ORE 14-48	Prospects for International Air Transport.	G/Tr

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 22-48	Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action during 1948.	IAC
ORE 22-48	Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action (Addendum) during 1948-49.	IAC
ORE 25-48	The Break-up of Colonial Empires and its implications for US Security.	G/GS
ORE 26-48	Prospects for a United States of Indonesia.	B/FE
ORE 27-48	Possible Developments in China.	B/FE
ORE 29-48	Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany.	B/WE
ORE 32-48	Communist Capabilities in South Korea.	B/FE
ORE 38-48	Possible developments from the Palestine Truce.	SecDef
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ORE 44-48	Prospects for Survival of the Republic of Korea.	B/FE
ORE 49-48	Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations.	B/EE
ORE 50-48	Probable Argentine Policy to 1952 and its effects on US interests.	B/LA
ORE 51-48	Possibility of Soviet Troops Withdrawal from Germany.	NSC-4 Staff
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ORE 60-48	Threats to the Security of the US.	NSC
ORE 61-48	Probable Effects of Postponment of Italian Colonies Question.	G/IO
ORE 67-48	Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas.	B/NE
ORE 77-48	Chinese Communist Capabilities for the Control of all China.	NSC
ORE 16-49	The Yugoslav Dilemma.	B/EE

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
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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 17-49	The Strategic importance of the Far East to the US and the USSR.	B/FE
ORE 28-49	Possible Dvlps. in Soviet Policy toward Austria.	B/NE
ORE 29-49	Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist China.	B/FE
ORE 39-49	Probable Developments in Taiwan.	NSC
ORE 43-49	Trends in Air, Ocean and Railway Transportation.	G/Tr
ORE 46-49	The Possibility of direct Soviet military action during 1949.	IAC
ORE 48-49	The Soviet position in the CFM.	G/GS
IM-13	Probable Soviet reactions in Berlin to Western European union talks.	B/WE
IM-17	Memorandum to the President on Soviet intentions for the next 60 days.	IAC
IM-21	Soviet intentions for the next 60 days.	IAC
IM-23	Soviet objectives in the Far East.	B/FE
IM-24	Possible program of future Soviet moves in Germany.	B/WE
IM-29	Enemy attacks on continental US in the event of a major war.	JCS
IM-36	Probable Purposes of the Warsaw Conference.	DCI
IM-38	Soviet Tactics in Berlin.	B/WE
IM-45	Current Soviet Grain Situation.	DCI
IM-47	Estimate of the current Palestine Truce Situation.	SecDef
IM-48	Palestine Truce Situation.	WH

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>	
IM-50	Immediate Objectives USSR Negotiations re Germany.	WH	
IM-52	Current Thinking in the US about East-West Trade.	SecDef	
IM-54	An Estimate of the Advance Warning to be Expected by the Western Powers in the Event of Soviet Aggression in 1956.	JIG	
IM-55	Review of ORE 38-48 (Secretary of Defense). To be issued as Addendum subsequent to coordination.	SecDef	
IM-57	Political Stability and Alignment (1956) of Selected States and Areas (TS) - for Director Joint Staff, JCS. (and Supplement 24 Nov. formerly IM-84)	JCS	
IM-59	CIA Answers to Selected Questions for the Intelligence Briefing by the Intelligence Divisions of the Armed Services.	SecDef	
IM-61	Summary Economic Outlook in Union of South Africa, France, and Benelux, in 1956.	JIG	
IM-65	Effect of Situation in Indonesia on Strategic Interests of the US.	WH	
IM-67	Possible Transportation Crisis at Vienna.	DCI	
IM-69	Possible Communist Inspired Disturbances in Paris at Time of UNGA (S) - for DCI.	DCI	
IM-77 Supp.	Soviet Troop Withdrawals from Germany. Possibility of a Soviet Proposal for Quadripartite Troops Withdrawn from Germany.	NSC-4 Staff NSC-4 Staff	
IM-89	[REDACTED]	G/Ec	25X6
IM-90	Ability of the Communist Party of Guadeloupe to Disrupt the West Indian Conference.	G/SI	
IM-108	[REDACTED]	IAC	25X6
IM-112	Effect of the Communist-dominated China on South-	WH	

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-123	Estimate of Current Soviet "Peace" Moves.	NSC-4 Staff
IM-124	Continuing Instability in Greece.	JIG
25X1C IM-133		JIG
IM-135	Estimate of the Situation in the Event of War During FY 1952.	JIG
IM-141	Brief Evaluation of Soviet Intentions.	SecDef
IM-142	Probable Enemies, Allies, and Neutrals in the Event of War before 1953.	NSRB
IM-144	Soviet-Communist Capabilities for Sabotage.(TS).	JIG
IM-145	Political Repercussions of the Economic Situation in Spain.	B/WE
IM-146	Soviet Deficiency in Strategic Items in 1952.	JIG
IM-149	Soviet Reaction to Scandinavian Adherence to the Atlantic Pact.	SecDef
IM-151	Probable Significance of Bulganin-Vasilevski Shift.	DCI
IM-156	The Will and Ability of Certain Countries to Support and Develop their Armed forces, from their own Resources and with US Aid.	JIG
IM-159	Estimated Budget and Manpower Available for Military Purposes in Certain Countries Through 1953.	JIG
IM-161	Reactions in Tripolitania to an Italian Trusteeship.	NSC
IM-164	The Will and Ability of Certain Countries to Support and Develop Their Armed Forces, from Their Own Resources and with US Aid.	JIG
IM-168	The Will and Ability of Certain Countries to Support and Develop their Armed Forces, from their Own Resources and with US Aid.	JIG

Group C: Consequences of a Selected Course of Action.

A paper that usually proceeds from action decisions or accomplished facts to a prediction of the consequences that can be presumed to follow. A common variant of this type is noted: the action decision is assumed to have been made, or an event to have taken place, and the consequences are then predicted as if developing from an actual event.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 21/1	Probable Soviet Reactions to a US Aid Program for Italy.	SANACC
ORE 55	The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine.	IAC
ORE 69	Consequences of Communist Control of Greece.	NSC
ORE 6-48	Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means.	NSC
ORE 10-48	Consequences of Certain Courses of US Action in Greece.	NSC
ORE 41-48	Effect of Soviet Restriction on the US position in Berlin.	B/WE
ORE 47-48	Consequences of the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Tsingtao.	NSC
25X6 ORE 48-48	Probable Effects [REDACTED] of a UN Arms Embargo.	IAC
ORE 57-48	Consequences of a Breakdown in Four-Power Negotiations on Germany.	B/WE
ORE 58-48	The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and Near East (To Cairo) prior to 1950.	G/GS
ORE 3-49	Consequences of US Troops withdrawal from Korea in the Spring of 1949.	NSC

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 40-49	Consequences of Dutch "Police Action" in Indonesia.	WH
ORE 41-49	Effects of a US Foreign Military Aid Program.	SecDef
IM-18	Possibility of Soviet military action in consequence of Congressional action on UNT or SS acts.	IAC
IM-31	Kremlin reaction to US aide-memoire of 4 May.	B/EE
IM-34	Kremlin Reaction to Unification of Germany.	B/WE
IM-53	Review of ORE 47-48 (Tsingtao). Issued as addendum to ORE 47-48.	NSC
IM-100	Consequences of Expediting US Military Aid to China.	NSC
IM-113	Consequences of Dutch "police action" in Indonesia.	WH
IM-118	Probable Soviet Reaction to a US Attempt to Force the Berlin Blockade.	WH
IM-167	Estimated Effects on Poland of a Softer United States Economic Policy.	B/EE
IM-173	Revision of ORE 41-49 "Effects of US MAP".	SecDef

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Group D: Background Material

This type of paper essentially selects factual data in order to provide a correct frame of reference. The method used is historical, in that it organizes and interprets established data and does not undertake prediction.

This type of paper essentially reports on the basis of timeliness intelligence information of any or all kinds. It may, as part of its intent, include an evaluation of the material reported, or an indication of the material's significance.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 2	Analysis of Soviet Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts.	WH
ORE 2/1	Analysis of Soviet-Controlled German Broadcasts.	WH
ORE 4/1	Petroleum Resources Within the USSR.	[REDACTED]
ORE 7	Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia.	B/FE
ORE 11/1	Review of the Soviet, British and French Programs with Respect to Germany.	G/SI
ORE 16	Soviet Objectives in Latin America.	B/LA
ORE 16/1	Soviet Objectives in Latin America.	B/LA
ORE 17	[REDACTED]	G/EC
ORE 20	Basic Dutch-Indonesian Issues and the Linggadjati Agreement.	B/FE
ORE 65	The Venezuelan Elections of 14 December 1947.	B/LA
ORE 16-48	[REDACTED]	NSC
ORE 20-48	Soviet and Satellite Grain.	G/EC
ORE 24-48	The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance.	B/FE

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 30-48	Limitation of South China as an Anti-Communist Base.	B/FE
ORE 34-48	Future Danube River Navigation and Control.	IAC
ORE 39-48	France's Policy Toward Germany.	B/WE
ORE 42-48	Soviet Rolling Stock and Motor Vehicle Industries.	G/Ec
ORE 46-48	[REDACTED]	B/FE
ORE 53-48	Postwar Industrial Recovery in France.	B/WE
ORE 71-48	The Kurdish Minority Problem.	B/NE
ORE 2-49	Major Problems of Italian Government Policy.	B/WE
ORE 6-49	Rubber Supply Situation in the USSR.	G/Ec
ORE 50-49	Significance of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance.	B/EE
IM-4	Paulus Army	DCI
IM-6	Rubber production in the USSR; Proven world oil reserves.	DCI
IM-9	Soviet armed forces statistics.	DCI
IM-12	Soviet aircraft estimates.	DCI
IM-22	Ruhr coal production (rations problem)	B/WE
IM-26	The Colombian political situation preceding the Bogota conference.	DCI
IM-40	The Food Supply of Certain Areas.	JIG
IM-43	Chinese National Government.	WH

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>	
IM-63	Military Strength Data on Selected Powers.	Mun.Bd.	25X6
IM-72	Postwar Sugar Production of the USSR.		
IM-73	Recent Soviet Purchases of and Negotiations to Obtain Natural Rubber.	Congress	
IM-76	Soviet Economy.	SecDef	
IM-88	Tungsten in South Korea.	ECA	
IM-91	World's Proved Crude Oil Reserves.	Congress	
IM-104	Petroleum Products in the USSR.	IAC	
IM-126	World Oil Data.	IAC	
IM-127	Significance of Western European Exports to the Soviet Bloc.	ECA	
IM-130	Transportation Facilities of Germany and France, 1938 and 1948.	JIG	
IM-157	Soviet Economic Conditions.	WH	
IM-158	Soviet Press and Radio Reaction to the first Public Announcement of the Atomic Bomb.	SecDef	
IM-166	The Commonwealth Conference of 21 April and India's Constitutional Status.	B/No	
IM-171	Soviet Industrialization.	JIG	

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Group E: Spot Reporting of Intelligence Information

This type of paper essentially reports on the basis of timeliness intelligence information of any or all kinds. It may, as part of its intent, include an evaluation of the material reported, or an indication of the material's significance.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 3/1	Soviet Capabilities for the Development and Production of Certain Types of Weapons and Equipment.	JCS
ORE 17-48	Civil Aviation Policies of Selected Powers.	WH
25X6 ORE 18-48	[REDACTED]	WH
ORE 19-48	Soviet Military and Civil Aviation Policy.	WH
ORE 31-48	Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao.	SecDef
25X6 ORE 37-48	[REDACTED]	F/WE
ORE 40-48	Prospects for Internationalization of Air Transport.	G/Ar
25X6 ORE 68-48	Opposition to ECA.	ECA
ORE 9-49	[REDACTED]	G/SI
ORE 11-49	The Caribbean Legion.	B/LA
IM-1	Technical data: Soviet RR gauge; tungsten.	DCI
IM-2	Soviet Army deserters in US and UK zones.	DCI
IM-7	Soviet pressure on Finland.	DCI
IM-8	Finnish resistance to Soviet Pressure.	DCI

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-10	Disturbance in Central America and Antarctica.	WH
IM-11	Recall of Soviet ships from US ports.	G/Tr
IM-14	Soviet airstrength in the Port Arthur naval base area.	DCI
IM-19	1948 Soviet defence appropriations.	DCI
IM-20	Soviet acquisition of crude rubber.	Congress
IM-25	Clandestine air transport operations in Europe	C/Tr
IM-27	Evaluation of Soviet officers' predictions of war.	DCI
IM-30	ORE comments on testimony of 23 April on Indonesian Congress strategic materials. (Has two supplements).	
IM-35	Evaluation re Movement of Soviet Embassy Personnel from Mexico to USSR.	DCI
IM-37	Cominform Denouncement of Tito and Yugoslav Communists.	B/EE
IM-39	Reaction of Satellite States to Tito's Defiance of Cominform.	B/EE
IM-41	Intelligence Information received by CIA bearing on the rift between the Cominform and the Tito regime.	SecDef
IM-42	Extent of Soviet and Satellite Fulfillment of Trade Pacts with the West.	DCI
IM-44	Expansion of Communist-controlled commercial air services.	DCI

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-49	Participation of Czechoslovakian Government in Clandestine Air Transport Operations.	DCI
25X6 IM-56	[REDACTED]	CI
IM-58	Soviet Military Expenditures in 1948.	JIG
IM-60 (a)	CIA Comments on JIG Paper on Economic Potential of Soviet, Satellites, and Allies, in Event of War in 1956.	JIG
IM-60 (b)	Relocation of Soviet Industry.	JIG
IM-62	Significance of Movement of Soviet and Satellite Military Personnel.	SecDef
IM-66	Communist Air Network in Southeast Asia.	DCI
IM-68	Possible Use in Costa Rica of Equipment for which Export License Has Been Requested.	B/LA
IM-70	Foreign Construction of Tankers for the USSR for Special US Rep. of ECA in Europe.	ECA
IM-71	Illegal Transshipment of Oil Equipment to Rumania by US Firm.	B/EE
IM-74	Evacuation by Air from Palestine of a Party Implicated in the Assassination of the UN Mediator.	G/Tr
IM-75 and IM-75 Supplement	Export Shipment of Ball Bearings to Satellite Countries.	B/EE B/EE
IM-78	Soviet Penetration into the Fisheries of the West Coast of Latin America.	IAC
IM-79	Relative Importance of the Soviet Union to Merchant Vessel Construction Demanded as Reparations from Italy.	ECA
IM-80	Reply to Request for Certain Information on Precision Bearings.	Congress

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-81	Soviet and Satellite Armed Strength.	Congress
IM-82	Intensification of Soviet Efforts to Procure Strategic Material. (Supplement 2/10/49) Soviet & Satellite Procurement of Strategic Materials.	B/EE B/EE
IM-83	Hungarian Efforts to Circumvent Prohibited Purchase of US Machine Tools.	JIG
IM-85	Comments on SANACC Paper (Subcommittee Near & Middle East.	SANACC
IM-86	Receipt of Non-Licensed US Equipment through Other Countries.	B/EE
IM-87	Soviet Financing of the French Coal Strike. (S)	DCI
IM-92	Soviet Air Force "Brief".	DCI
IM-93	Methods used by Soviet-controlled countries for acquisition of Strategic Commodities.	B/EE
IM-94	Matter of possible interest with reference to the visit of President Prio of Cuba.	B/LA
IM-95	Memorandum to President: Assumption of Power by the Military in Latin America.	WH
IM-96	Attempts by Eastern Europe to obtain I A and I B export control items through transshipments.	B/EE
IM-98	Possible Evacuation of Bernadotte Assassins from Palestine.	G/Tr
IM-99	Possible Cessation of Soviet Manganese Shipments to the USA.	G/EC
IM-101	Extent of Soviet Industrial War Potential East of and including the Urals; Activities in Trans-Caucasus Area.	JIG
IM-102	<div style="background-color: black; width: 500px; height: 50px;"></div>	JIG

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-103	Views of Indonesian Republic Representatives now in US.	B/FE
IM-107	Achmed Soekarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia.	WH
<div style="background-color: black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>		
IM-110	Alleged Argentine Participation in Recent Latin American Military Coups.	DCI
IM-114	Uncontrolled International Air Traffic Endangers US National Security, and addendum 1/7/49 in AD/R&E file.	G/Tr
IM-115	<div style="background-color: black; height: 50px; width: 100%;"></div>	JIG
IM-116	Flight of French Capital Through Underinvoicing.	G/Ec
IM-119	Inflationary Trend in Germany.	B/WE
IM-120	Possible scale of Transport Aircraft by Israel to Czechoslovakia.	G/TR
IM-121	Brief Evaluation of Transportation Maps of the USSR.	IAC*Air
IM-122	Imminent Reinforcement of Israeli Air Force.	G/TR
IM-125	CIA Comments on JIG Estimate for War Plan for an Emergency Occurrence in 1952-53.	JIG
IM-128	The Change in Government in Paraguay.	B/LA
IM-129	Foreign Reaction to the US Position on the Stalin "Peace Interview".	IAC-State
IM-131	CIA Comment on Despatch No. 276 Jidda to State dated 27 December 1948.	IAC-State
IM-132	Harmon Committee Project.	JIG

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
IM-134	Soviet Rubber Purchases in Indonesia.	DCI
IM-136	Military Budgets.	SecDef
IM-137	[REDACTED]	
IM-138	[REDACTED]	
IM-139	Estimate of the Significance of Soviet Personnel Changes.	SecDef
IM-143	Soviet All-Union Budget for 1949.	DCI
IM-148	External Financial Operations of the USSR & the Satellites.	NSRB
IM-150	Attempts to Procure Strategic Items Indirectly From US by the USSR and Satellites.	ECA
IM-152	Construction of Short-Wave Transmitter in the Spanish Colony of Fernando Po.	LAC
IM-153	[REDACTED]	
IM-155	Recent Anti-American Demonstrations in Latin America.	DCI
IM-160	West German Reaction to Unity Overtures.	B/WE
IM-165	CIA Evaluation of the Zapotocky Remarks Concerning Soviet Plans for East-West Conflict.	SecDef
IM-170	Munitions Production at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.	WH

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Group F: Miscellaneous

This category is used to cover items which, for various reasons, were unclassifiable.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Origin</u>
ORE 64-48	Evidence of USSR Military Intentions in Soviet Propaganda Broadcasts.	IAC
IM-3	Protocol "M".	DCI
IM-28	Questions prepared for Ambassador Bullitt.	DCI
IM-32	Questions prepared for Ambassador Harriman.	DCI
IM-33	Questions prepared for Forrestal contact bound for Africa.	DCI
IM-46	Inquiry concerning Service Airways personnel.	DCI
IM-64	CIA Recommended Redraft of Selected Sections of JIG 380/5.	JIG
IM-140	Estimate of the Optimum Time of Year for War to Commence, from the Soviet Viewpoint.	JIG

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